Grenfell Phase 2 Report Update

Introduction

On 30th October 2019, the Panel in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry published its Phase 1 report following an investigation of the fire that broke out on 14th June 2017. The Phase 1 report included findings on how the fire started, how it escaped from the flat where it had begun and how it spread over the whole building. In September 2024, the Grenfell Tower Inquiry published its final Phase 2 report which focussed on the root causes of the fire. In Phase 2, the Inquiry Panel has been investigating the underlying causes of the fire with a view to identifying where mistakes were made and ensuring that a similar disaster cannot occur again.

The report concluded that all 72 deaths that resulted from the fire were avoidable. The fire was result of a “culmination of decades of failure by central government and other bodies in positions of responsibility in the construction industry”. There were years of missed opportunities to prevent the disaster by local and central government, despite numerous warnings. David Cameron’s coalition government’s moves to cut red tape dominated government thinking at the Department for Communities and Local Government, which was responsible for building issues, at the expense of safety. These failures were compounded by the systematic dishonesty of Arconic, Celotex and Kingspan, whose combustible products were wrapped around Grenfell Tower. Ultimately, the major factor in the cause of the fire was blamed on “unscrupulous” building firms.

Publication of the report is still recent and the future impact of the findings of the report on legislation and best practice is not yet evident. As such, many housing providers, particularly social landlords, may be uncertain of what they should be doing and areas to focus on to ensure they stay complaint and protect the safety of their staff and tenants. This article will outline the main findings of the report and recommend areas of service provision that housing providers should review to ensure they are complying with relevant legislation and best practice.

Report Overview

Part 4 of the report sets out the Inquiry’s findings in respect of the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) in place at Grenfell Tower. The TMO was found to be poorly run for a long time and the relationship between the TMO and residents was marked by “distrust, antagonism and increasingly bitter confrontation”. This shows a serious failure on the part of the TMO to observe its basic responsibilities.

Part 5 of the report found that there were persistent failures within the TMO and the Council to give sufficient importance to the issue of fire safety, particularly the safety of vulnerable people. This was shown through a lack of communication around issues of fire safety, reliance on individuals who lacked appropriate experience and qualifications in fire safety, failure to carry out remedial work identified in fire risk assessments promptly, lack of a proper maintenance regime for fire prevention systems and a failure to maintain reasonably accurate records of vulnerable residents who were likely to need help to escape if a fire occurred.

Part 6 looked at the refurbishment of the Tower and found that the TMO, as a Client, manipulated the process of organising the works to avoid the need to invite open tenders for architectural services. The TMO wanted to appoint an architect that had no experience in overcladding a high-rise building. In addition, both the principal contractor and the cladding sub-contractor were not aware of the properties of the materials to be used in the refurbishment, which was partially responsible for flammable cladding being used. There was an inability amongst those involved in the refurbishment to allocate responsibility for decisions that were made during it, particularly in relation to the selection of the cladding. Further, the fire engineers appointed to assist in the refurbishment produced three versions of a fire safety strategy, but each version did not included advice on the effect of the overcladding, which it said would be covered in a future issue of the report. No one asked for a final version of the draft fire safety strategy or provided the engineers with details of the proposed cladding to allow them to finish the strategy, so it remained incomplete.

Part 10 of the report considered the authorities’ response to the fire. It concluded that the Council failed to put in place suitable plans or provide training to its staff to enable them to respond effectively to the fire. It did not have the capacity to identify individuals who needed accommodation or other assistance and did not have adequate communication arrangements in place for both those involved in the incident and the public.

Part 14 of the report contains the Panel’s recommendations following this phase of the Inquiry. There were many recommendations made but those of key important to housing providers and social landlords include:

• the establishment of a body of professional fire engineers, properly regulated and with protected status and the introduction of mandatory fire safety strategies for higher risk buildings;

• a licensing scheme for contractors wishing to undertake the construction or refurbishment of higher-risk buildings; and

• the regulation and mandatory accreditation of fire risk assessors.

Conclusion

As can be seen from the above, there is a lot of information contained within the Grenfell Inquiry report that is relevant to housing providers, particularly social landlords. It can be overwhelming and leave many organisations unsure of what they need to do and areas to focus on to ensure they are complying with legal requirements and best practice. Taking all of the above into consideration, ACS recommends that organisations look at the following areas within their organisation:

1. Ensure that fire safety strategies are suitable for all building types. For example, a ‘stay put’ strategy will not be appropriate where there is a risk of fire spreading over a building’s external walls.

2. Ensure that fire safety strategies account for the safety of all occupants, with particular consideration for vulnerable tenants. This may require the development of Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) for residents with mobility issues or other impairments.

3. Ensure that, during construction projects, the safety of building users is not compromised due to speed and cost demands of projects.

4. Ensure that there are robust procedures in place to assess the competency of third parties used in construction projects.

5. Have clear roles and responsibilities set out at the start of each construction project which are formally accepted by each party involved so that everyone knows what responsibilities they have for the duration of the project.

6. Use competent and qualified Fire Risk Assessors.

7. Follow up on findings and recommendations set out in Fire Risk Assessments timeously.

Are you concerned about fire safety compliance? With the publication of the Grenfell Inquiry Phase 2 report, it's clear that housing providers, social landlords, and property managers must take proactive steps to ensure fire safety for their tenants.

ACS is here to help. We offer a range of fire safety services and training designed to meet the needs of your organisation:

• Fire Safety Risk Assessment and Review

• Tower Block Fire Safety Risk Assessment with Structural Appraisal

• Fire Safety Management Systems (Policies and Procedures)

• Audit of Fire Safety Arrangements

• Fire Safety Awareness, Management, and Warden Training

• Fire Safety Online Learning

Protect your tenants and your organisation - ensure compliance and best practice.

Contact us today for more information about our fire safety services at 0141 427 5171 or at info@acsrisk.com.